Abstract-The transmission times with generally random distributed for both primary user (PU) and secondary user (SU) in a cognitive radio system with a single PU band is investigated. To characterize the random access protocols of wireless networks, a retrial queueing system is employed to model the decentralized and centralized behavior of SUs. Based on the tradeoff between the service reward and the delay cost, each SU must decide whether to join or balk the system upon arrival based on different levels of information provided by the system. Two situations in which SUs have no information or partially observable information are studied. In each situation, two kinds of strategies are considered: 1) individual equilibrium strategies (i.e., non-cooperative strategies) that maximize SUs' own profit and 2) socially optimal strategies (i.e., cooperative strategies) that maximize the expected social welfare. Moreover, comparisons are carried out between these two kinds of strategies. The results indicate that the equilibrium joining probability in the non-cooperative case is not less than the optimal joining probability in the cooperative case. To regulate the SUs' behavior, an equilibrium pricing scheme is proposed to make these strategies coincide. In addition, we observe that the expected delay and the mean number of SUs in the system only depend on the first two moments of the SU's transmission time. Numerical examples also show that the partially observable queue is more profitable from the perspective of the social planner.
To improve the utilization, Miltola [2] introduced the concept of dynamic spectrum access (DSA, also known as cognitive radio), which allows SUs (without a license) to access a licensed spectrum band flexibly without interfering with the PUs (with a license). Thanks to the adaptability and capability of CR, it is possible to use the spectrums efficiently.
In principle, opportunistic spectrum access can be classified as a centralized or decentralized cognitive medium access control protocol based on the concept of dynamic spectrum sharing. In the centralized case, a central controller determines the spectrum access for all SUs to maximize the social welfare. However, with decentralized or distributed dynamic spectrum access, an SU can decide on spectrum access independently and autonomously to maximize its own utility. In the literature, a large portion of works focuses on analysis of the performance and opportunistic spectrum sharing strategy [3] , [4] . Since the decentralized behavior of SUs raises several challenges regarding system load balancing, such as optimal revenue for operators and congestion-avoidance incentive for SUs, in this paper, we investigate the decentralized (individually optimal) and centralized (socially optimal) behavior for SUs and try to make SUs behave in a centralized manner.
In the decentralized case, the revenue-optimal SUs can be regarded as players in a noncooperative game because every SU entering the system may cause a service delay for others. In contrast, the SUs in the centralized case behave like players in a cooperative game. Recently, game-theoretic studies on the Nash equilibrium and socially optimal strategy of SUs have emerged. Li and Han [5] studied the individually optimal strategy of SUs in the observable discrete-time queueing case, where an arriving SU is informed of the queue length. According to DSA, a licensed PU band can be viewed as a server, and arrivals of the PU will disrupt the service process of any SUs. They concluded that the individually optimal strategies deviate from the socially optimal ones. Later, Jagannathan et al. [6] extended the analysis to a continuous time queueing system with exponentially distributed service times, and the situations in which the state of the server is available or unavailable were investigated to obtain the equilibrium strategies of SUs. Following Jagannathan et al. [6] and Do et al. [7] discussed the same model but under the case in which no system information is provided for SUs. Tran et al. [8] considered price-based spectrum access control between the network operators and SUs under different 2332-7731 c 2017 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission.
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market scenarios. They assumed that service times for the PU and SUs follow general distributions. Tran et al. [9] considered a joint optimization problem on pricing and load balancing in two network markets (i.e., monopoly and duopoly markets). However, all papers mentioned above assumed that the service regulation of SUs is first come, first served (FCFS). This discipline may not apply in wireless systems with random access.
Recently, Wang and Li [10] studied the equilibrium joining strategies and socially optimal strategies of SUs with random access. In their analysis, the service times of the PU and SUs were assumed to be exponential and SUs have the information of whether the server is idle or not upon arrival. Apparently, the assumption that the service time is exponential is not consistent with the real-world phenomenon. For example, in a data network, the arrival process of packets is Poisson while the service time distribution can be arbitrary due to different packet length. Analogously, the data session's arrival process is often Poisson, whereas the distribution for the length of the data file can be heavy-tailed (e.g., [11] ). On the other hand, the service capacity of the channel is a random variable following arbitrary distributions because of fading and/or bandwidth (e.g., [12] and [13] ). So we assume the service time follows a general distribution. In this regard, there is a series of works on general service time in cognitive radio networks without game-theoretic analysis [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] . The retrial queueing literature offers some works on the retrial queues with general service time and service disruptions; see [19] [20] [21] [22] [23] [24] [25] [26] , among others. However, to the best of our knowledge, no paper considers game-theoretic equilibrium analysis for the retrial queueing system with general service time and service disruptions in applications in CR systems.
In this paper, we investigate the equilibrium behavior of SUs and optimal pricing in the CR system with random access and general transmission time. We first carry out an extensive study of individually optimal and socially optimal strategies of SUs. Based on comparison between these equilibrium strategies, an optimal pricing scheme is presented to make them coincide. With respect to the pricing-based spectrum management, it incurs lower overhead compared with existing market-based mechanisms, such as auction-based spectrum, which bears significant overhead in the auction process including market setup time, bidding time, pricing clearing time, etc. Furthermore, the pricing-based scheme is easy to implement due to the low complexity; see [27] [28] [29] [30] and the references therein.
The main contributions of this work are as follows. First, a mathematical analysis of equilibrium behavior of SUs and optimal pricing in cognitive radio networks with random access and general transmission time is offered. Second, SUs' equilibrium strategies and socially optimal strategies are derived explicitly, and based on these strategies, an optimal pricing mechanism is proposed to induce SUs to behave in the socially desired way. Third, some managerial insights regarding the influence of different levels of system information are provided to analyze which one is more profitable from the perspective of the social planner: revealing or concealing the system's information to SUs. This study observes that the social planner can obtain more profit by revealing partial information. Fourth, it is observed that the expected delay and the mean number of SUs in the system only depend on the first two moments of the SU's transmission time, and is in fact independent of the distribution function of the SU's transmission time.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II provides a detailed description of the basic model. Steadystate solutions are given in Section III. Section IV investigates the individually optimal and socially optimal strategies. In Section V, we compare the joining probabilities and propose an admission fee to make them coincide. Section VI compares the strategies numerically and indicates which one is more profitable for the social planner. The conclusion is provided in Section VII.
II. DESCRIPTION OF THE MODEL
We consider a cognitive radio system with a PU channel which has a single licensed PU operating in it and can be opportunistically accessed by SUs. The SUs arrive in the system according to a Poisson process with rate λ. SUs require different transmission times which are independently and identically distributed (i.i.d.) random variables with common general distribution function F(·) and probability density function (p.d.f.) f (·). Then the transmission rate can be expressed as
As to the PU, we assume that the inter-arrival times of the PU are exponentially distributed with rate α and its transmission times are also i.i. 1−G(y) . Dynamic spectrum access means that when the licensed band is not occupied by the PU (i.e., this band is idle), SUs can use the channel without causing any interference to the PU. If an SU finds the band idle upon arrival, it can utilize the band immediately; otherwise, it will join a virtual waiting room (call an orbit) with unlimited capacity and act as a repeated user. Independent with others, each retrial user repeats its request after an exponential amount of time with rate θ , just like the back-off process, until it finds an idle band and completes its service. In addition, the PU has higher priority than SUs (i.e., an arriving PU can immediately occupy the band even if the band is in use by an SU). The interrupted SU has higher priority than other SUs and it can utilize the band once the service of the PU is completed. It is assumed that the service time for an SU is accumulative. Accordingly, there are four states of the sever: idle, occupied by an SU, occupied by the PU with a preempted SU, and occupied by the PU without a preempted SU. Finally, we assume that the arrival process, service processes of the PU and SUs, and intervals between retrials of SUs are mutually independent.
Considering that the PU can occupy the band to be served immediately upon arrival, here we just pay attention to the SUs. If an arriving SU decides to join the CR system, it incurs a waiting cost C per unit time that reflects the delay sensitivity (i.e., the time interval between the arriving instant and the instant before being served). After completion of the service, the SU receives a reward R. We assume that all the SUs are strategic and risk neutral and they decide whether to join or to balk the system upon arrival. Moreover, the SUs' decisions are irrevocable. Thus, neither the reneging of entering SUs nor the retrial of balking SUs is allowed. Considering the level of information available to the SUs, in the following sections, two cases will be analyzed: the unobservable case and the partially observable case. In the unobservable case, all the SUs have no information about the PU band, while in the partially observable case each SU can sense the PU band to learn whether it is idle or not.
With decentralized or distributed dynamic spectrum access, since the self-optimizing arriving SUs are indistinguishable and are concerned only with their own benefit, in the game theory context, all the potential SUs behave like players in a symmetric game among them, and their strategies are joining and balking. Let U(s tagged , s others ) be the utility of a tagged SU that follows strategy s tagged , when others follow strategy s others . Then one strategy s e is a Nash equilibrium if it is the best response against itself; that is, U(s e , s e ) ≥ U(s, s e ) for every s ∈ ϕ (ϕ is the set of available actions). Thus, a general joining strategy is specified by a joining probability q, and we assume that the utility of a balking SU is 0. Furthermore, in the centralized case, we investigate the optimal joining strategy to maximize the expected social welfare. On the other hand, in the partially observable case, if the server is idle upon arrival, the arriving SU can occupy the PU band without waiting. So, joining is a dominant strategy of such an SU; that is, the SU joins the system with probability 1. Otherwise, due to the service delay, the SU joins the orbit with probability q to retry later to maximize its own benefit and the social welfare, respectively. The corresponding network topologies are described in Figures 1 and 2 .
Throughout this paper, we use * to represent the Laplace transform and − to denote the complementary cumulative distribution function, for instance, g * (s) = ∞ 0 g(y)exp{−sy}dy andḠ(·) = 1 − G(·). We assume the transmission time distributions of the PU and SUs have finite first two moments as follows:
Thus, if the transmission times for the PU and SUs are exponentially distributed with parameters β and μ respectively, then
Moreover, we denote the traffic intensity for the PU and SUs by ρ 1 = λμ 1 and ρ 2 = αβ 1 , respectively, and define ρ as ρ ≡ ρ 1 (1 + ρ 2 ). Table I summarizes the notations used in the paper. 
III. STEADY-STATE SOLUTIONS
In order to investigate SUs' equilibrium strategies that aim to maximize their own expected utility or the expected social welfare, in this section, some steady-state solutions are discussed for the unobservable and partially observable cases.
Let N(t) be the number of SUs in the orbit at time t. Denote the elapsed transmission time of the SU who is in transmission by X(t) and the elapsed transmission time of the PU by Y(t) at time t and define the state probabilities at time t as follows: 1) P I,i (t) is the joint probability that the server is idle and there are i customers in the orbit at time t, where i ≥ 0. 2) P S,i (t, x)dx is the joint probability that at time t there are i customers in the orbit, and the server is serving an SU whose elapsed transmission time is between x and x + dx, where i ≥ 0. 3) P P,i (t, y)dy is the joint probability that at time t there are i customers in the orbit, and the server is serving the PU whose elapsed transmission time is between y and y + dy, where i ≥ 0. 4) P PS,i (t, x, y)dy is the joint probability that at time t there are i customers in the orbit, the server is serving the PU whose elapsed transmission time is between y and y+dy, and the elapsed transmission time of the preempted SU equals x, where i ≥ 0. We can easily verify that constructed stochastic process
The transition rate diagram for this process can then be illustrated in Figure 3 , where δ = 1 is for the partially observable case and δ = q for the unobservable case.
Before proceeding with the derivation of steady-state solutions, we firstly give the stable condition for such a system in the following lemma.
Lemma 1: The Markov Process is ergodic iff ρq < 1.
The above condition guarantees the existence of stationary distribution of the Markov Process. So ρq < 1 is assumed to hold from now on and we concentrate on the system in steady state. Denote by P I,i
when the system is stable, then the following balance equations (for i = 0, 1, 2, . . .) and normalizing equation for the above multi-dimensional Markov Process can be obtained:
where P S,−1 (x) 0, P PS,−1 (x, y) 0, P P,−1 (y) 0 for any x and y. In order to solve these equations, the following generating functions are introduced for |z| ≤ 1:
Multiplying the equations (1)- (7) by z i and summing over i, after some algebraic manipulations, these equations (1)- (7) can be expressed as follows
From equations (11) and (13), we derive that
Based on equation (16), we obtain the following equation by solving the differential equation (10)
Combining equations (12) and (13) together, we get
Similarly, from equations (9) and (17), the equation
can be obtained. For simplicity, we introduce a notation to represent the frequently-used item in the above equation
The general solution of the above differential equation can be written as
where C 1 is a constant to be determined. Thus,
Letting z → 1 in equation (21), we have
This yields
Since the normalizing equation can be rewritten as
we can get that C 1 = 1−ρq 1+ρ 2 +ρ(δ−q) . To summarize, we have the following theorem. Theorem 1: At steady-state status, for such a cognitive radio system where all SUs enter the system with an idle server following probability δ (δ = 1 for the partially observable case and δ = q for the unobservable case) and the system with a busy server following probability q, we have the following results.
1) The probabilities that the server is under different states are as follows: a) The probability that the server is idle is
The probability that the server is serving an SU is
The probability that the server is serving the PU without a preempted SU is
The probability that the server is serving the PU with a preempted SU is
In the unobservable case (δ = q), the mean number of SUs in the system is given by
3) In the unobservable case (δ = q), the mean waiting time for an SU who chooses to join the system is given by
4) In the partially observable case (δ = 1), the mean number of SUs in the orbit is given by
5) In the partially observable case (δ = 1), the mean waiting time for an arriving SU, who finds the PU band unavailable and chooses to join the orbit with probability q, is given by
Remark 1: It is observed that the average waiting time and mean number of SUs only depend on the first two moments of service time.
IV. JOINING STRATEGIES
In this section, according to the steady-state solutions we have obtained, we investigate the customers' equilibrium strategies when they aim to maximize their own profit, and the socially optimal joining strategies when their purpose is to maximize the expected social welfare, respectively.
A. Non-Cooperative Strategy
In the case of decentralized cognitive medium access control protocol, assume all the SUs are selfish and they aim to maximize their own expected benefit. Then an arriving SU needs to weigh the service reward against the cost of the mean waiting time. That is, if the reward is greater than the cost, the SU would prefer to join the system (or the orbit), otherwise it chooses to balk. If the reward equals the cost, it is indifferent between joining and balking. The decisions of the SUs are interacted on each other. Thus, this process can be modeled as a symmetric non-cooperative game, and our goal is to find the Nash equilibrium of this game. Note that when δ = 1, i.e., the partially observable case, considering an arriving SU who finds the PU band available can occupy the PU band immediately, in this case we only pay our consideration to the SUs finding the PU band unavailable.
From Theorem 1, the SU's expected utility of entering the system (or the orbit) is given by U δ (q) = R − C · E δ [W(q)] (δ = q for the unobservable case and δ = 1 for the partially observable case).
Taking the first derivatives of (23) and (25) with respect to q, we have
which means the mean waiting time increases as q increases. Therefore the expected utility is strictly decreasing in q. Now we proceed to the analysis of the SUs' equilibrium strategies, which is divided into two cases as stated in the following theorems, i.e., ρ < 1 and ρ ≥ 1.
Theorem 2: For the cognitive radio system with ρ < 1, a unique Nash equilibrium strategy 'enter with probability q e δ ' exists (δ = 1 for the partially observable case and δ = q for the unobservable case), which is given by
where
For the case of ρ ≥ 1, an analogous result can be obtained as follows by the similar analysis.
Theorem 3: For the cognitive radio system with ρ ≥ 1, a unique Nash equilibrium strategy 'enter with probability q e δ ' exists (δ = 1 for the partially observable case and δ = q for the unobservable case), which is given by
where E δ [W(0)] and q ee δ are given in (27) - (28), (29)-(30). Remark 2: Note that the type of SUs' behavior can be described as "avoid the crowed" (ATC). The reasons for that are as follows. Recall that U δ (q) decreases as q increases, then when other SUs adopt joining strategies q smaller than q e δ , the expected utility of an arriving SU is positive if it chooses to join the system (or the orbit). Thus, the best response of the SU is q = 1. Similarly, the best response of an arriving SU is q = 0 if other SUs adopt joining strategies q greater than q e δ , and any strategy is the best response if the joining strategies of other SUs are q = q e δ . Thus for the higher joining probability others choose, it is best for an SU to adopt a lower joining probability, which is consistent with the description of ATC.
Notice
Then we have the following corollary.
Corollary 1: For the cognitive radio system where SUs enter the system with an idle server following probability δ (δ = 1 for the partially observable case and δ = q for the unobservable case) and the system with a busy server following probability q, the equilibrium joining probability q e δ satisfies q e q ≥ q e 1 . That phenomenon described in the above corollary can be explained as follows. In the partially observable case, the SUs who arrive and find the PU band unavailable have to wait some time to be served. But in the unobservable case, the arriving SUs have no information of the PU band, and that means it is possible that the PU band is available and the arriving SU can occupy the band without waiting. Thus, the equilibrium joining probability in the unobservable case is not less than that in the partially observable case.
B. Cooperative Strategy
In this subsection, we pay our attention to the centralized cognitive medium access control protocol, and assume that the purpose of all the SUs is to make the expected social welfare maximize, which helps to improve the performance of the cognitive radio networks. Hence, in this situation, the relationship between SUs becomes cooperative, and we turn our interest to find the optimal joining strategies from the perspective of a social planner.
Because the social benefit per unit of time is the sum of all the joining SUs' benefit per time unit. Then when all the SUs adopt the mixed strategy 'join the system (or the orbit) with probability q', the objective function of the social planner, i.e., the expected social welfare per time unit S soc δ (q) (δ = q for the unobservable case and δ = 1 for the partially observable case) is
where λ * is the effective arrival rate of the system for the partially observable case and
For the unobservable case, taking the second derivative of S soc q (q) with respect to q, we have
Therefore, take the case where ρ < 1 for example, S soc q (q) is strictly concave in q ∈ [0, 1]. In addition, if the following
we denote the solution as q 1 q . Furthermore, we derive
,
On the other hand, for the partially observable case, the analysis for the monotonicity of S soc 1 (q) with respect to q is relatively more complicated. We investigate it in the following lemmas.
Lemma 2: If ρ < 1, with respect to q ∈ [0, 1], (i) when
is strictly increasing, where
Lemma 3: If ρ ≥ 1, with respect to q ∈ [0,
1 (q) first increases then decreases. Based on the monotonicity analysis, in the following two theorems, according to conditions ρ < 1 and ρ ≥ 1, we give the optimal joining probability q * δ maximizing the expected social welfare per unit time. 
Theorem 4:
If ρ < 1, at steady state, for the cognitive radio system where SUs enter the system with an idle server following probability δ (δ = 1 for the partially observable case and δ = q for the unobservable case) and the system with a busy server following probability q, the optimal joining probability q * δ which maximizes the expected social welfare per unit time is given by
and M 3 , M 4 are given in equations (41)-(42), respectively. Theorem 5: If ρ ≥ 1, at steady state, for the cognitive radio system where all SUs enter the system with an idle server following probability δ (δ = 1 for the partially observable case and δ = q for the unobservable case) and the system with a busy server following probability q, the optimal joining probability q * δ which maximizes the expected social welfare per unit time is given by
, A 1 = M 3 , and M 3 is given in equation (41).
V. ADMISSION FEE
Based on the analysis for the equilibrium joining probabilities and socially optimal ones, we can easily find that the individual strategies deviate from the socially optimal ones. However, in practice, it is often expected that individuals behave in a socially optimal way, since the decentralized behavior of SUs raises several challenges regarding system load balancing, optimal revenue for operators, congestionavoidance incentive for SUs, etc. Thus, in this section, we try to make the individually equilibrium joining probabilities coincide with the socially optimal ones. Comparisons between the equilibrium joining probabilities and socially optimal ones are first made in the following lemmas for the unobservable queue (δ = q) and partially observable queue (δ = 1), respectively.
Unobservable queue: δ = q. Lemma 4: For the cognitive radio system where all SUs enter the system with probability q, the relationship between the equilibrium joining probability q e q and optimal joining probability q * q is q e q ≥ q * q . Partially observable queue: δ = 1. Lemma 5: For the cognitive radio system where all SUs enter the system with an idle server following probability 1 and the system with a busy server following probability q, the relationship between the equilibrium joining probability q e 1 and optimal joining probability q * 1 is q * 1 ≤ q e 1 . From Lemmas 4-5, we know that the equilibrium joining probability is not less than the socially optimal one. The reasons for that are as follows. Every SU entering the system may lead to the delay of other SUs increasing, which is called negative externalities. Because SUs are selfish, they behave independently to make their own profit maximal without considering the negative externalities they impose on other SUs. That means they may overuse the PU band. However, the social planner takes these externalities into consideration, and aims to maximize the profit of all the SUs entering the system. Thus, in the latter case, less SUs join the system, contributing to a less congested system. As a result, the equilibrium joining probability is not less than the socially optimal one. In order to make the system more efficient, i.e., eliminating the difference between equilibrium joining probability and the socially optimal one, an admission fee p is employed and given in the next theorems.
Firstly, we focus on the case ρ < 1. Theorem 6: If ρ < 1, at steady state, for the cognitive radio system where all SUs enter the system with an idle server following probability δ (δ = 1 for the partially observable case and δ = q for the unobservable case) and the system with a busy server following probability q, the admission fee p δ which eliminates the difference between equilibrium joining probability and the socially optimal one is given by
where A δ and A δ are defined in Theorem 4, p 2 q is the solution of equation
and p 2 1 is the solution of equation
For the case ρ ≥ 1, the admission fee which makes the the individually equilibrium joining probabilities coincide with the socially optimal ones can be obtained in a similar way, as described in the following theorem.
Theorem 7: If ρ ≥ 1, at steady state, for the cognitive radio system where all SUs enter the system with an idle server following probability δ (δ = 1 for the partially observable case and δ = q for the unobservable case) and the system with a busy server following probability q, the admission fee p δ which eliminates the difference between equilibrium joining probability and the socially optimal one is given by
where A δ and p 2 δ are given in Theorem 6.
VI. NUMERICAL EXAMPLES
In this section, we first present two numerical examples to make investigations on the cooperative and non-cooperative strategies under certain distributions of transmission times for the PU and SUs. Then some comparisons between the individually optimal and socially optimal strategies are illustrated. Lastly, we investigate the effect of the levels of information precision on the social planner's welfare.
A. Under Certain Distributions Example 1 (Exponential Transmission Times for the PU and SUs):
In this example we let the distribution function of the transmission times for SUs be F(x) = 1 − e −x with the first two moments μ 1 = 1, μ 2 = 2, and that for the PU be G(y) = 1 − e −2y with the first two moments β 1 = β 2 = 0.5. Assume the parameters R = 5, C = 1, λ = 1, θ = 0.5, α = 0.3.
For the unobservable case, from equation (23), we have E q [W(0)] = 0.33 < R C = 5 and ρ = 1.15 > 1. Hence, according to Theorems 3 and 5, the individually equilibrium joining probability is q e q = 0.49, and the socially optimal joining probability is q * q = 0.3. For the partially observable case, from equation (25),
can be obtained. So the equilibrium joining probability for SUs arriving and finding the PU band unavailable is q e 1 = 0. When analyzing the optimal joining probability to maximize the social benefit, we get
Example 2 (Gamma Distributed Transmission Times for SUs and Erlangian Transmission Times for the PU):
In this example, assume the density function of the transmission times for SUs be f (x) = 
For the partially observable case, we have
Thus the equilibrium strategy in the noncooperative case is q e 1 = 0. In addition, because of R C < M 3 , the optimal joining strategy in the cooperative case is also q * 1 = 0. Remark 3: For the partially observable case, when the transmission times for the PU and SUs follow exponential distributions, our model becomes that discussed by Wang and Li [10] , i.e., the model in [10] is a special case of our analysis.
B. Comparisons Among the Joining Probabilities
In this subsection, we pay our attention to investigate the effects of parameters on the joining probabilities in the noncooperative and cooperative cases, under different levels of information available to the SUs. Specifically, we examine how the joining probabilities in the non-cooperative and cooperative cases change with respect to α, θ , μ 1 , μ 2 , β 1 , β 2 , and compare the two kinds of strategies.
Figures 4-6 illustrate the effects of the parameters, i.e., μ 2 , β 2 , α, θ , on the joining probabilities. Clearly, in equilibrium, with the increase of the second moments of the transmission times for the PU and SUs, or the arrival rate of the PU, the probability that SUs join the system or the orbit becomes less. The reasons for that are as follows. Firstly, regarding to the second moments of the transmission times (μ 2 , β 2 ), the variances for the transmission times of the PU and SUs increase in the second moments. And the bigger the variance, the higher the volatility of the service times. Those all impose negative effects on the choice of SUs to enter the system (or the orbit). 
Then the arrival rate of the PU (α) increasing implies the probability that an SU under transmission is preempted becomes greater, resulting in longer mean waiting time for SUs. In contrary, the larger of retrial rate (θ ), the less of the mean waiting time, which contributes to more SUs joining the system (or the orbit).
With respect to the first moments of the transmission times for the PU and SUs, i.e., μ 1 and β 1 , since all the arriving SUs prefer the situation where the mean and the variance for the transmission times are small, the rise of μ 1 and β 1 has two effects on the SUs' choice to enter the system (or the orbit). The first one is positive. That is, the larger the first moments, the smaller the variances, which results in an arriving SU is more incentive to enter. However, the growing first moment means the mean transmission time increases, which imposes negative effects on the SUs. Thus, how the joining probabilities change as μ 1 and β 1 increase is determined by which one of the two effects plays a dominant role as showed in Figures 8-9 . In Figure 8(a)-(b) , when the first two moments of the transmission times for the SUs, i.e., μ 1 and μ 2 , are small, the positive effect exceeds the negative one, so that the equilibrium and optimal joining probabilities q e δ , q * δ are nondecreasing with μ 1 . Such a trend continues to a certain value. When μ 1 is higher, the negative effect dominates and q e δ and q * δ start to decline as μ 1 increases. However, when μ 2 is large enough, the joining probabilities approach or even equal 0 no matter what the value of μ 1 is as shown in Figure 8(c) . And the change trend of the joining probabilities with respect to the first moment of the transmission times for the PU as shown in Figure 9 can be explained by similar reasons.
Thus, the effects of system parameters on SU's joining strategies can be summarized as follows: (i) The first moments of transmission times may have positive or negative effects on SU's joining probabilities, and which one dominates is affected by the second moments of transmission times; (ii) The bigger the second moments of transmission times, the smaller the SUs' joining probabilities. (iii) SUs are more incentive to enter the system (or the orbit) when the retrial rate grows; (iv) The increasing arrival rate of PU imposes a negative effect on SUs' choice to enter the system (or the orbit).
On the other hand, based on Figures 4-9 , it can be found that in equilibrium, no matter what the amount of information available to the SUs is, the joining probability in the noncooperative case is not less than that in the cooperative case, i.e., q e δ ≥ q * δ . That coincides with the theoretical analysis in the previous sections. If an admission fee p is imposed on the SUs joining the system, from Figure 10 , we know the individually equilibrium joining probabilities decrease with respect to p, while the socially optimal joining probabilities remain unchanged as p increases. That induces there exist admission fees making the individually equilibrium joining probabilities coincide with the socially optimal ones. In addition, it can been observed that the equilibrium joining probability or the socially optimal one in the unobservable case is not less than that in the partially observable case, that is, q e q ≥ q e 1 and q * q ≥ q * 1 . That is because the probability that an arriving SU finds an idle PU band and occupy it is nonzero in the unobservable case.
C. Comparisons Among the Social Welfare
In this subsection, we try to compare the social welfare in the unobservable case and partially observable case. Firstly, we compare the social welfare when the amount of information provided for SUs is different and the SUs follow the individually equilibrium joining probabilities, i.e., S soc q (q e q ) and S soc 1 (q e 1 ). Then under different levels of information, comparisons between the socially maximal welfare in the cooperative case are made, i.e., S soc q (q * q ) and S soc 1 (q * 1 ). Figures 11-16 show the trends of the expected social welfare per time unit with respect to the parameters, when the SUs follow the corresponding individually equilibrium strategies and the socially optimal ones, respectively. ) . Thus, from the perspective of the social planner, it is more profitable if some information is revealed, no matter which one of the individually optimal and socially optimal strategies the SUs adopt.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we investigate the SUs' equilibrium strategies and socially optimal joining strategies from the economic viewpoint. A retrial queueing system is employed and the transmission times for the PU and SUs follow general distributions. Specifically, two situations under different levels of information (i.e., an SU has no information about the system upon arrival or it can sense whether the PU band is idle or not) are discussed. In each situation, we study the individually optimal and socially optimal strategies, which maximize their own profit from the perspective of SUs and the expected social welfare from the perspective of the social planner, respectively. By some comparisons, the equilibrium joining probability in the non-cooperative case is not less than the optimal joining probability in the cooperative case because of the selfishness of SUs, regardless of the amount of information provided for arriving SUs. Facing such a situation, an admission fee p is employed to make them coincide. Also, the equilibrium joining probability in the unobservable case is not less than that in the partially observable case, like the socially optimal joining probability. It is observed the expected delay and mean number of SUs only depend on the first two moments of service time. In addition, based on numerical examples, we conclude that the social planner would prefer the case in which some information is provided for arriving SUs so as to obtain more profit.
APPENDIX
Proof of Lemma 1: Let X be the time it takes to complete an SU's service, taking into account the time lost due to interruptions. From [24] , we know that E(X) = μ 1 (1 + ρ 2 ) . Thus, to make the system stable, we must have
Further, let Q n denote the number of SUs left behind by the nth departure of SU. Then it is readily to see that {Q n , n ≥ 0} is irreducible and aperiodic, and it is positive recurrent if ρq < 1 from [23] . So we have the sufficient and necessary condition for the ergodic of the Markov Process is ρq < 1.
Proof of Theorem 1: Firstly, denote the probability that server is idle, serving an SU, serving the PU without a preempted SU and serving the PU with a preempted SU by I δ , S δ , P δ and PS δ , respectively. Then , y) dxdy, from which the above results can be obtained by direct calculations.
Secondly, let K(t) be the number of SUs in the system at time t, then the generating function of K(t) can be expressed as
Thus, the mean number of SUs in the system E δ [K(q)] is equal to Q (1) . In the unobservable case, according to the Little's Law
λq , the mean sojourn time in the system of an arriving SU E q [S(q)] can be derived. From Wang et al. [24] , we know that the mean transmission time of an arriving SU is μ 1 (1 + ρ 2 ) . Since the mean sojourn time in the system is the sum of the mean waiting time and the mean transmission time, we have the expression of the mean waiting time in the system for δ = q as stated in the third case of the theorem.
Likewise, for the partially observable case, the mean number of SUs in the orbit E 1 [N(q)] can be derived. Based on the effective arrival rate of the orbit, i.e., λ r = λq(1 (1+ρ 1 −ρ 1 q) , and applying the Little's Law, E 1 [W(q)] in the fifth case can be obtained.
Proof of Theorem 2:
Since U δ (q) is strictly decreasing in q, then U δ (q) has a unique maximum U δ (0) and a unique minimum U δ (1) .
. That means the best response for an SU is balking and q e δ = 0 is the unique equilibrium, which gives the first part of (26) .
, there exists a unique solution q ee δ for the equation U δ (q) = 0, q ∈ [0, 1]. So we obtain the second part of (26) .
If
is positive for all q ∈ [0, 1]. Thus, joining is the best response for an SU, i.e., q e δ = 1 is the unique equilibrium point. That gives the third part of (26) .
Proof of Lemma 2: The first derivative of S soc 1 (q) with respect to q can be expressed as
Let
By some algebraic manipulations, we have
is negative for all q ∈ [0, 1]. Thus, S soc 1 (q) decreases as q increases in this case.
Part 2: When A < 0, it implies that 
Proof of Lemma 3:
The proof for the case ρ ≥ 1 is similar to that for ρ < 1. We omit it here.
Proof of Lemma 4: Firstly we consider the case ρ < In addition, when R C > E q [W(1)], the socially optimal joining probability q * q is not greater than 1. But in this case, q e q is always equal to 1.
As for the case ρ ≥ 1, the proof is similar, and we omit it here. Thus, the conclusion described in the lemma can be obtained.
Next, we introduce Lemma 6 that will be used in the proof of Lemma 5. Proof of Theorem 6: If an admission fee p is imposed on SUs joining the system, the social objective function stays the same as (34) − (35) because the admission fee just transfers from SUs to the server. So the socially optimal joining probabilities are the same as described in Theorem 4. As for the SUs joining the system, the equilibrium joining probability becomes respectively. Then each part can be obtained easily.
